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Max Weber's thesis of a relation between a Protestant ethic and a
spirit of capitalism is examined. The Calvinist calling is taken as the
central notion of Weber's thesis. Weber fails to demonstrate that
the doctrine of the calling would channel the motivational force of
religious interests into ascetic, economic activity that could be
innovative in the face of traditional patterns ofbehavior. He fails in
two ways: (1) he does not demonstrate a strict logical,meaningful
relation between these elements; and (2) he does not account for
the changing historical dynamics of Calvinism itself. If the
configuration of events occurred as Weber argued, then
nonreligious factors would be crucial in bringing it about. Yet, such
factors take us outside of the framework in which Weber was
working and, more seriously, they contest the very basis of his
argument: the influence of religious forces on the capitalistic spirit.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is a critique of Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and
the Spirit of Capitalism. The critique is logical and internal; it is
not a critique of his facts. We focus on Weber's treatment of
Calvinism as the clearest and most distinctive expression of his
thesis. Furthermore', our critique' has nothing' to say about the: ....
"idealist-materialist" controversy over the role of ideas in history:
or in psychological motivation. Ideas indeed may be the
switchmen of our interests. The question is whether Weber
logically and meaningfully demonstrates that ideal Calvinism
necessarily transfers religious interests into mundane orientations.
Also, we treat Weber as concerned with explaining the role of
religious forces in the formation of the specific, historical
configuration called Western capitalism. Weber states (1958:90):
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Weare merely attempting to clarify the part which religious forces
have played in forming the developing web of our specifically
worldly modern culture, in the complex interaction of innumerable
different historical factors. We are thus inquiring only to what
extent certain characteristic features of this culture can be imputed
to the influence of the Reformation. (All unspecified page
references are to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalism.)
After a short summary of Weber's argument, we will
comment on the notions of the calling and the "proof of
salvation." We make three points in relation to the calling. First, as
a doctrine of Calvinism it need not lead people to pursue
innovative economic activity. Instead, it can serve to support the
traditional social order. Second, if the calling does lead to
innovative worldly activity, this activity need not be expressed in
economic activity. Third, the notion of the calling as a mechanism
of arriving at certainty of grace (through observing the external
results of one's activity) is contradictory to the basic tenets of
Calvinism. It is, indeed, a later development of Calvinism. This
shows the historical change of Calvinism.
This implicit recognition of the historical dynamics of
Calvinism points to the importance of nonreligious factors in the
Protestant ethic thesis. This conclusion is strengthened by the
absence of a strict, logical, meaningful relationship between the
calling and ascetic, economically oriented work. Hence, if the
conjunction of the spirit of capitalism and the Protestant ethic did
occur, it must be the product of nonreligious factors external to
the. religious ,~~~B1ents that Weber delineates a~s Calvinism. Note
that we are not evaluating the idea of a spirit of capitalism; we are
looking only 'attheproposed religious antecedents of such a spirit.
WEBERSARGUMENT
Weber begins his ideal type with "practical religious
interests." For the epoch in question this was an interest in
salvation. Concern with the afterlife "absolutely dominated the
most spiritual men of the time" (p. 97). It is because of this
concern that the Calvinist doctrine of predestination is so
important. Predestination placed the believer in complete
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aloneness before his God. For the most important thing in his life,
his eternal salvation, no one could help him. He was alone. There
was no way around this doctrine. It developed as a "logic~l
necessity" from the transcendental character of God. In this
connection, Weber underscores the rationality of the doctrine and
the religion.
Instead of splitting the community into individual atoms
oriented toward the "other world," Calvinism fused the religious
community together in an orientation toward this world. This
resulted from the Calvinist use of the notion of Christian brotherly
love. The world exists only to serve the glorification of God: the
elect work in the world to fulfill His commandments and, thereby,
glorify God. One of His wills is that social life shall be organ~ed
rationally in accordance with His commandments. God requIres
this "social achievement." Thus, as the elect labor in the world for
the glory of God, they focus on the community and. on
approximating the ideal organization of a Christian com~unlty.
The elect fulfill the injunction of brotherly love by labormg for
the general social good. Thus, the commandment can be fulfilled
without the emotional experience of or attachment to our fellow
man. An emotional experience of "the flesh" was abhorrent to
Calvinism (pp. 105-6, 122). Further, this social labor is oriented
toward achieving a community organized according to His
commandments. Hence, traditional, "merely human" social
patterns must be overcome if they conflict with the furthering of
the Divine plan. There is a religious justification for innovation in
the face of traditional- patterns. Since this social activity of the ~
elect is work for the glory of God, a sacred character is given to
"the mundane labor of the community. The'- Calvinist' "calling"
emerges. Weber observes (pp. 108-9):
Brotherly love, since it may only be practiced for the glory of G~d
and not in the service of the flesh, is expressed in the first place m
the fulfilment of the daily tasks given by the lex naturae; and in the
process this fulfilment assumes a peculiarily objective. and
impersonal character, that of service in the interest of the rational
organization of our social environment. For the wonderfu~y
purposeful organization and arrangement of the cosmos 15,
according both to the revelation of the Bible and to natural
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intuition, evidently designed by God to serve the utility of the
human race. This makes labour in the service of impersonal social
usefulness appear to promote the glory of God and hence to be
willed by Him.
Quandaries concerning the meaning of the world, life, good and
evil were avoided: one worked for the glory of God.
The motivation driving this religious-worldly labor derived
from a question of proof: How can I know that I am among the
elect? Rightly speaking, and according to Calvin, one cannot know
and it is nonsense to ask. Such stiff drink, however, is not the stuff
of the masses. Weber concludes (p. 110):
F or them the certitudo salutis in the sense of the recognizability of
the state of grace necessarily became of absolutely dominant
importance. So wherever the doctrine of predestination was held,
the question could not be suppressed whether there were any
infallible criteria by which membership in the electi could be
known.
Two "responses" developed to this tension, one contingent
and one internal to Calvinist doctrine. The response of pastoral
work was to stress the duty to consider oneself among the chosen
and to labor away cheerfully at one's calling. Activity reduces
anxiety and strengthens the spirit. On the other hand, God was
absolutely transcendental; there was an abhorrence of the
emotional experience of God. To claim that He would traffic with
the flesh was to idolize the flesh. Thus, grace could not be proved
by an .inward emotion, it had to be shown by objective results, If
the certitudo salutis was to be found, it would be found in the real
world (pp.111-2).
The Calvinist sought to identify "true faith" by ascertaining
that conduct which served to increase the glory of God. The
proper conduct was to be found by "his own will" either directly
in the revelations of the Bible or indirectly in the "purposeful
order of the world which he has created (lex naturae)" (p. 114).
The individual was made aware that his conduct, "at least in its
fundamental character and constant ideal," was founded on a
"power" within him that was thereby the grace of God and
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worked for the glory of God. He could examine his worldly
conduct for signs of salvation (p. 115):
Thus, however useless good warks might be as a means of attaining
salvatio n . . . they are indispensable as a sign of election. They are
the technical means, not of purchasing salvation, but of getting rid
of the fear of damnation.
The chief characteristic of this notion of good works was that
it formed a rationalized system of life. A good work could not be
treated as an individual act conducted against the backdrop of
one's life but had, instead, to be woven into the very cloth of
one's existence. The quality of the life of an elect, it was believed,
would be expressed in all of his conduct. There could be no
discrete act of goodness as there could be no discrete part of the
soul that was elect. One was either of the elect or he was not. The
upshot was that (pp.117-8):
the moral conduct of the average man was thus deprived of its
planless and unsystematic character and subjected to a consistent
method for conduct as a whole.... For only by a fundamental
change in the whole meaning of life at every moment and in every
action could the effects of grace transforming a man from the
status naturae to the status gratiae be proved.
The result was a rationalized worldly life carried on in an ascetic
manner. Man labored rationally for the glory of God and not for
the flesh.
.. _The relation of Weber's argument thus far to. the capitalistic
spirit is direct. The logical working out of the concept of a
transcendental God focused attention" on ascetic activity in the
mundane world rather than on emotionalism or consumption. The
tension generated by the doctrine of predestination provided the
dynamics to rationalize life around the calling and overcome the
barriers of traditional ways. In away, religious idealism was
brought into the market place. Man must not only avoid
impulsiveness and sensualism; he must also conduct himself
uprightly and honestly. His belief that he was among the elect was
at stake.
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Weber states (p, 172):
Asceticism looked upon the pursuit of wealth as an end in itself as
highly reprehensible; but the attainment of it as a fruit of labour in
a calling was a sign of God's blessing. And even more important:
the religious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a
worldly calling, as the highest means to asceticism, and at the same'
time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith,
must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the
expansion of that attitude toward life which we have here called
the spirit of capitalism.
When the limitation of consumption is combined with this release
of acquisitive activity, the inevitable practical result is obvious:
accumulation of capital through ascetic compulsion to save.
DISCUSSION
Our critique hinges on Weber's treatment of the calling: what
is its relation to other elements of Calvinism? Does it logically and
dogmatically follow that the calling emerges from a concern with
the commandment of brotherly love? For instance, if brotherly
love is not explicitly united with the calling, then a dogmatic,
religious motivation to rationally pursue mundane work is
removed. Nonreligious factors would then have to be used to
explain the existence of a capitalistic ethos. But if we concede the
causal connection of brotherly love and the calling, does Weber
demonstrate that the calling would find sole expression in
explicitly economically oriented activity? Furthermore, is there a
logical relation between the calling as an expression of brotherly
love .and the calling as a mechanism of ascertaining one's .state of
grace? Might these two conceptualizations of the calling be
contradictory, in principle, and, in fact, be more appropriately
treated as two conceptualizations of the concept of the calling at
different points in time? If so, then when they are juxtaposed
within a single framework (which then is called Calvinism), the
historically changing dynamics of the institution of Calvinism are
ignored. This is a systematic bias in Weber's analysis. The
preoccupation with meaningfully related internal elements of
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Calvinism leads to the systematic exclusion of nonreligious events
and elements.
The Calling and Brotherly Love
As we have seen, the calling provided a solution to the
fulfillment of the .duty of brotherly love without one laboring "in
the service of the flesh." One worked for the general good of the
community in accordance with His commandments. God was
glorified without men laboring for the glory of men.
The difficulty arises in Weber's use of the terms brotherly
love and social achievement. The elect are in the world to increase
the glory of God by fulfilling His will. One will is the
commandment of brotherly love and another is to achieve a social
organization in accordance with His commandments. If brotherly
love does not entail social organization (or, vice versa), then there
are two "commandments" that must be fulfilled. Weber explicitly
recognizes their separation (p. 108), but quickly passes over it. He
treats the terms as if they were almost synonymous. In so doing,
he obfuscates the real question: In what way are the two duties to
be related? There are two polar options. Brotherly love may be
seen as primary. It provides the "reason" for the social
achievement. Brotherly love and His will (as the directing goal of
the social achievement) stand outside of the earthly social order.
In contrast, one's obligation may be oriented toward the existing
social organization. The social order is considered as given, at least
for the purposes of salvation. One fulfills the obligation of
0_ brotherly love within the structure. of the society.
- The import of this distinction emerges in the degree of
traditionalism that the doctrine Oaf the calling manifests toward the
society. In the Calvinist calling as construed by Weber, the
doctrine of brotherly love serves as a motivation for the
construction of the social achievement: it is external to the
society. The individual is the tool through which God works. One
labors to realize Christian brotherly love in the world by trying to
achieve a social organization that approximates the Divine plan.
This, of course, is not a consciously revolutionary plan vis-a-vis the
"earthly institutions" of man. Nevertheless, since the focus is on
the glorification of God, one is led to be innovative in the face of
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misguided earthly social patterns: one must seek to rationalize his
own life in accordance with and in pursuit of the Divine will. If,
however, primacy is given to the social organizarion, one fulfills
the obligation of brotherly love within the society. One accepts
the existing social order and his role in it; one seeks to honor the
commandments within the framework of the social order. The
orientation is inherently conservative.
The latter position is identified with Lutheranism. The
conservatism of the Lutheran calling sets it apart from the
Calvinist calling. Both of these notions are grounded in the
Lutheran insight that (p. 81):
The fulftlment of worldly duties is under all circumstances the only
way to live acceptably to God. It and it alone is the will of God,
and hence every legitimate calling has exactly the same worth in
the sight of God.
Of course, Luther deduced a different conclusion than Calvin.
Weber states about Luther (p. 85):
The stronger and stronger emphasis on the providential element,
even in particular events of life, led more and more to a
traditionalistic interpretation based on the idea of Providence. The
individual should remain once and for all in the station and calling
in which God had placed him, and should restrain his worldly
activity within the limits imposed by his established station in life.
Both of these radically different notions of the calling are
equally "logical" solutions to the expression of brotherly love and
the legitirnacy of earthly labor. They both begin with a similar
insight: the religious value of work. From .this common base they
deduce different notions of the calling. Either notion is an equally
logical solution to the Calvinist "problem" of brotherly love: How
may it be practiced for the glory of God without being in service
of the flesh? The idolization of the flesh, the emotional experience
of God, is equally avoided whether one fulfills the duty of
brotherly love by work within the God-ordained social order (as in
Lutheranism) or by work oriented to achieving a social order in
accordance with His will (as in Calvinism). Since they are equally
acceptable, doubt is cast on the logical, meaningful connections of
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the ideas involved. Logically-meaningfully, it could just as well be
one outcome as another. Hence, the rational formulation of the
ideal type approach is undermined.
Furthermore, Weber explicitly mentions that in Luther's
development of the calling he hit upon. the justification of the
calling in terms of brotherly love (pp. 81, 108). However, this
notion remained for Luther a "purely intellectual suggestion." It
was not developed as in Calvinism; it remained a "suggestion."
Evidently, it did so in response to essentially nonreligious factors
(p. 85). Thus, for Weber, this conjunction of Lutheran ideas is
"causally" related in terms of forces external to religion instead of
logically, meaningfully related in terms of religious forces. Weber
does not offer such an analysis for the Calvinist calling.
Nevertheless, the situation is the same. If Calvinism did unfold as
Weber suggests, then nonreligious forces would seem to
predominate in this process for there is no strict, logical,
meaningful relationship between them. This is a substantive
oversight as well as a methodological weakness: substantive
because important causal factors are not examined;
methodological because the ideal type approach, by defmition,
would exclude crucial causal factors.
The Calling and Economic Activity
Our second critique is that there is nothing in the Calvinist
calling that would lead it to be especially expressed in mundane
labor. The calling is oriented toward the rational organization of
the social environment; this derives from labor "in the fulfillment
of the dally tasks given by 'the lex naturae" (p. 109). The lex ..
naturae refers to the moral order of'the world· that ultimately-.
exists because of the fundamental nature of God's cosmos. As
such, it would seem that the calling, as a religious orientation,
need not find its expression solely, or even predominantly, in
economically useful activity. The objective results needed by the
calvinist as signs of salvation may logically be found in religious
and political spheres of life as well as the economic sphere.
Two Conceptualizations of the Calling
OUf third critique concerns the development of the doctrine
35
Mid-American Review of Sociology
of a "proof of salvation." Weber's formulation of Calvinism is
essentially ahistorical; yet, the doctrine of proof needs historical
treatment. The doctrine of proof was neither explicitly contained
in early Calvinism nor implicit within it. The attempt to treat
proof of grace within the ahistorical framework of Calvinism leads
to difficulties, because the historical inadequacies of the treatment
of Calvinism become apparent. Calvinism was not developing in a
historical vacuum nor was it unilaterally affecting behavior. In
addition, there is a rational inconsistency between a doctrine of
proof and the rest of Calvinism. This is a hard blow for an ideal
type schema which is based on a rationally related set of elements.
There is, however, an even more fundamentally damaging element.
The dynamic motivation for the calling comes ultimately from the
transcendentality of God and predestination doctrines. The
resulting anxiety over salvation is channeled into the calling
through the doctrine of a proof of grace. If it is shown that the
doctrine of proof either did not exist with, or is inconsistent with,
the other elements of Calvinism (e.g., predestination; the
transcendentality of God and, therefore, the repudiation of
emotionalism, sensualism), then the major motivational syndrome
for the calling has been removed. Without the utterly
transcendental God, ascetism in practical activity (as a norm of
practical life, not as an ideal) and the need for objective signs of
grace become superfluous; without predestination, the anxiety
over salvation is greatly reduced.
Weber observes that the calling did not emerge in Calvinist
thought until ~(t~r_. the interest in a proof of salvation had
developed. It was the -"development which brought the interest in
proof of salvation' to the fore" that brought the Lutherans' calling
into Calvinism (p. 210; compare with pp. 108-9). This notion of
the calling developed in an attempt to gain the certainty of
salvation and not in response to the fulfillment of Christian
brotherly love (and/or the social achievement). It would seem that
one sought not to realize God's will in his daily tasks, but to crack
His eternal secret and wisdom. This bifurcation of religious
motivation indicates that there are two concepts of the calling in
use by Weber: calling-as-proof-of-salvation and
calling-as-expression-of-brotherly-Iove (or social achievement).
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This split is underscored by the fact that the latter notion of the
calling requires elements of Calvinism in its formulation (especially
the transcendentality of God, predestination and a strict
rationalism) which contest the doctrine of proof. Furthermore,
these elements are presumably needed in the conception of the
calling-as-proof-of-salvation if this activity is to be expressed in
socially useful work, yet they are logically inconsistent with this
conception.
The historical point, as Weberindicates, is that the doctrine
of proof developed in later Calvinism and is not "pure" Calvini~m
(p. 110). By juxtaposing these two concepts of the calling
together, Weber obfuscates the historical nature of the proof .of
salvation: A static picture is arranged of parts that do not exist
together at the same time. Change in the doctrine need not be
accounted for. We will argue below that this change cannot be
treated as a logical development of Calvinism. Hence, recourse
must be had to nonreligious explanations. The explanation of the
capitalist spirit is not furthered, for the main explanatory element
(i.e., Calvinism) is itself problematic even within the focus of the
study. In addition, the psychological motivation in Calvinism at
different points of time need not be the same. This point is neither
accounted for nor raised.
The rational inconsistencies between a doctrine of proof and
the rest of Calvinism emerge in the logical development of the
doctrine of proof. Strictly speaking, this doctrine would never
have developed for Calvin or early Calvinism. The things of the
_. world could never reveal God's. will (p. .124). Such an orientation,
however, could never be held by the mass of ordinary men. The
certitude salutis would' be' of extreme- iinportance for them,
evidently because of their lower moral development (this element,
for example, cannot be explained within the religious framework).
So, if the doctrine of predestination was still maintained, the
question would arise as to the existence of infallible c~teria to
ascertain one's state of grace. The difficulty, however, IS that to
ask this question and to seek an answer for it, requires a pattern of
thought that moves beyond and- out of the earlier Calvinist
framework and, in so doing, contests the earlier thought pattern.
For, to assert the doctrine of proof is to deny both the
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transcendental quality of God and thus, by implication, the very
basis for the doctrine of predestination. This almost completely
eliminates the orientations that are to produce the dynamic
motivation for the calling.
This comes about in the following way. The underlying basis
for the whole Calvinist ethos-capitalistic spirit thesis is the utter
rationality of Calvinism (p. 232). It is a force and drive of almost
"locomotive" proportions. If this rationality leads us into
paradoxes; then the entire system is called into question. Yet if
God is transcendental and if the strict logical interpretation is that
of the uselessness of the things of the world before God and the
complete aloneness of the individual, then the riddle of salvation
can never be "cracked" by worldly results or human social
activity. One cannot be a Calvinist and ask about salvation. If the
doctrine of proof of salvation is maintained, then either a mistake
has been made in the reasoning (which Weber does not hold) or
else God is not transcendental. But, if God is not transcendental,
then the world may not be predestined. Hence, this particular
problem of salvation becomes superfluous. This problem is made
somewhat more embarassing to Weber's position because he
maintains that emotionality never entered into "the psychological
basis of Calvinistic social organizations." This basis always rested
on individualistic, rational motives which remained above the
"threshold of consciousness" (p. 223). Presumably, then, for
Weber's thesis, the actors consciously and rationally knew what
they were about. Such actors could never rationally draw the
conclusions thatadoctrine of proof would require ...
As has been pointed out above, recourse cannot be made to
irrational or emotional motivation syndromes. Todo so moves us
beyond the frame of reference: Weber's version of Calvinism and
his ideal type schema as a rationally related set of elements.
The rational inconsistencies can be seen in Weber's treatment
of the Westminister Confession. This document assures the elect of
"indubitable certainty of grace" (p. 228). Without modification
of Calvinist doctrine, this assertion leads to certain inconsistencies.
These inconsistencies are not accounted for in Weber for he holds
to an ahistorical notion of Calvinism. Besides the rational
inconsistency which was mentioned above, much depends upon
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what the proof of grace is taken to be. If it is merely the subjective
feeling of certainty, then the proof becomes somewhat irrelevant
to Weber's thesis and may definitely detract from the kind of
economically useful activity that he wants to establish. If the
proof is taken to rest in works that are loosely deemed holy (as
opposed to mundane labor), then the proof becomes positively
damaging to Weber's thesis. If the proof is to be found in objective
results, then Weber's thesis will be supported, yet an additional
problem has been created and must be faced. Our Calvinist actors
cannot be naive observers of the world and must observe that the
objective signs of grace sometimes accompany people of, at best,
doubtful character. (This reintroduces the theodicy problem that
Weber sought to avoid: Weber, 1958:109; Weber, 1946:275,359.)
Presumably, this would have to be explained away. To do so
would involve either doubting the Divine order in some way or
else doubting the sign of grace. The latter course would probably
be chosen for the former would cast doubt upon the whole
enterprise. In working out the latter position, if the problem is to
be avoided again, then some sort of non-objective proof of grace
must be chosen. This moves the problem back to one of the earlier
options and does not strengthen Weber's case. And, if the entire
difficulty is ignored, we have an indication of the presence of
arational elements which would be damaging to the basic
rationality of his thesis.
CONCLUSION
In our critique, we have focused on Weber's argument and its
logical interrelations, We have treated Calvinism as the most
important and clearest example of the Protestant ethic thesis. We
have examined the logical, meaningful relationship between the
elements that Weber delineates as Calvinism and their relation to
ascetic, mundane work. Note that we have not critiqued the spirit
of capitalism notion nor argued that such a "spirit" is
problematical in itself. Instead, we have argued that the thesis that
there are religious antecedents for such a spirit is problematical.
There is no. strict, logical, meaningful relationship between
the elements treated as Calvinism nor between these elements and
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the spirit of capitalism. If, however, it is maintained th~t. the
Calvinist configuration did occur as claimed, then nonreligious
factors would have to be introduced to account for this
conjunction of elements. Recourse to a nonreli~ous explan~tion .is
mandatory, for there is' no logical, meaningful relationship
between these elements in the purely religious sphere. These
nonreligious factors may be idealistic as well as materialistic. T~e
point simply is that they must be used and they ar~ not. T~us, .It
appears that disparate elements are taken from varIOUS pomts In
time and blended together to form a static picture. This picture
appears to form a Protestant ethos that is related to a spirit of
capitalism only if the historical dimension with its implicit
interaction between elements and forces is ignored.
Weber, Max
1946
1958
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There have been marked disagreements in the literature on the
structure of power in American society. The authors suggest that
this controversy is an artifact of ideological differences between
sociologists and political scientists. This hypothesis is tested
through the use of a pluralism-elitism scale. Political scientists are
found to score toward the pluralistic end of the spectrum, while
sociologists are concentrated toward the elitist end, thus providing
preliminary support for the hypothesis.
The structure of power in American society constitutes an
unresolved problem among social scientists (Ricci, 1971). While
research into the structure of community power has moved
beyond the ideologically based clashes of Hunter (1953) and Dahl
(1961) so that today the question is no longer "who governs" but
rather "who governs under what conditions, where, and when,"
still the ideological components of the issue remain to whet the
curiosity of the researcher. Why. is it ~Qat when sociologists
investigate the structure of power they tend to discover a "power
'elite" (a small integrated -group' 'of power holders who rather
undemocratically dominate decision making), but when political
scientists investigate the structure of power they tend to discover
that power is dispersed among many groups in a rather democratic
way (in essence, a "pluralist" structure)? Moreover, why is it that
sociologists are strongly inclined to employ a "positional" or
"reputational" approach in locating power holders while political
scientists are more inclined to employ a "decisional" approach?
While research has moved beyond the ideological stage of
"power elite" vs. "pluralist" orientations so that Clark (1968) can
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